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Executive Summary
Agriculture is th e largest and the most important industries in many developing 
countries. A typical pattern observed in these countries is high inequalities of land 
ownership, that is, a small number of people own large portion of arable lands and large 
number of farmers have a small piece of land or even don’t have anything. Farmers 
usually lease land wholly or partially from large landowners and pay typically 50% of 
their harvest. This tenancy or sharecropping contract imposes heavy burden on farmers, 
which results in th eir poverty. Scholars and policymakers claimed that the burden of rent 
lowers produc tivity of farmers and that the low income further prevents the farmers from 
investing for the future. These factors aggravate living condition of farmers and ultimately 
economic growth of the country.
Land reform is regarded as a solution to break this vicious circle. Land redistribution 
can improve farmers’ income, and this allows them to invest for improve quality of land 
or for educating their children. Therefore, it is very important to examine how would land 
reform is implemented, how would land reform changes level of inequality, and how 
would it change production activities and investment, and so forth.
The goal of this study is to investigate, arguably, a successful case of land reform, the 
land reform of Korea. During the colonial period from 1910 to 1945, almost 50% of 
farmers were tenants without having any land at all and 20% were partial tenants. After 
the liberation in 1945, the Korean government made efforts to perform land reform, and it 
was completed by 1951. Investigating the impact of land reform on agricultural productivi 
ty and human capital investmen t will contri bute to better understanding Korean economic 
develop ment. And it will provide important implications for many developing countries.
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For this goal, we reviewed previous studies on land reform. And then, we explored 
the impact of land reform on agricultural productivi ty and its contri bution to human 
capital accumulation. Using prefecture level data, we esti mated the impact of land 
ownership in this period. Our estimation shows that land reform improved agricultural 
productivi ty. This implies that land reform could contribute to economic growth after the 
liberation.
We then performed empirical analysis on the relationship between the land reform and 
the secondary school enrollment rate is conducted to examine whether the land reform has 
contributed to the accumulation of human capital in Korea by utilizing the gun level data. 
The possibility of effect being differen t on gender is also evaluated. The results imply 
that the region with higher increase in share of independent famers during the land reform 
show higher increase in secondary school enrollment rate. This proves the hypothesis that 
land reform influenced positively on the accumulation of human capital. Also, the 
secondary school enrollment rate of female increased as the share of independent farmers 
rose, when the increase in enrollment rate of male proved to be statistically insignificant. 
This result is interpreted as when the income level of farmers went upwards by the land 
reform, female, who was negl ected in educati on due to male offspring preference, 
relatively gained more opportunity for education than male did.
Introduction
Agriculture is th e largest and the most important industries in many developing 
countries. A typical pattern observed in these countries is high inequalities of land 
ownership, that is, a small number of people own large portion of arable lands and large 
number of farmers have a small piece of land or even don’t have anything. Farmers 
usually lease land wholly or partially from large landowners and pay typically 50% of 
their harvest. This tenancy or sharecropping contract imposes heavy burden on farmers, 
which results in th eir poverty. Scholars and policymakers claimed that the burden of rent 
lowers produc tivity of farmers and that the low income further prevents the farmers from 
investing for the future. These factors aggravate living condition of farmers and ultimately 
economic growth of the country.
Land reform is regarded as a solution to break this vicious circle. Land redistribution 
can improve farmers’ income, and this allows them to invest for improve quality of land 
or for educating their children. Therefore, it is very important to examine how would land 
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reform is implemented, how would land reform changes level of inequality, and how 
would it change production activities and investment, and so forth.
The goal of this study is to investigate, arguably, a successful case of land reform, the 
land reform of Korea. During the colonial period from 1910 to 1945, almost 50% of 
farmers were tenants without having any land at all and 20% were partial tenants. After 
the liberation in 1945, the Korean government made efforts to perform land reform, and it 
was completed by 1951. Investigating the impact of land reform on agricultural productivi 
ty and human capital investmen t will contri bute to better understanding Korean economic 
development. And it will provide important implications for many developing countries.
We will first review previous studies on land reform (Chapter 2). And then, we will 
explore the impact of land reform on a gricultural producti vity and i ts contri bution to 
human capital accumulation (Chapter 3 and 4).
Tenancy and Land Reform: Literature Review
Basic Structure
Land and labor are two indispensable inputs for agricultural production. If a farmer 
cultivates his land without any help of others, things will be simple. However, if he leases 
land or hires workers, various contractual issues will emerge. A big complication is that 
land contract and labor contract are interlinked. For example, if a landowner decides to 
hire agricultural workers rather than leasing lands with tenancy contract, it means that the 
landowner compares contractual arrangements in labor and land markets. Partial equilibrium 
approach that focus either only on land contract abstracting labor contract or the opposite,  
might  fall into a proposition  that belies  actualities. 1  It is indispensable, therefore, to 
consider these two dimensions together.
It mi ght be convenient to provide a basic set-up for avoiding confusion and 
accommodating productive discussion (Figure 2 -1). Let’s consider a country where the 
land was owned equally by hundred farmers. And l et’s assume that they culti vate their 
own land without getting any help or leasing their lands to others. We can call it 
independent landed farmers and put it as a base case.
Now, we consider a case of large landholder. For simplicity, we assume that the 
whole land of this country is owned by one large landowner. If the government 
collectivizes the land, the large owner can be the government. Let’s focus on the case of 
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a large private landowner. The large landowner cannot cultivate the whole land alone. He 
should choose one of two alternatives. First, he can hire agricultural workers, supervise 
them, and culti vate his land. The landowner pays wage to the agricultural workers, but 
appropriates the whole outcome.1)
Figure 2-1| Efficiency of Tenancy: An Illustration
Second, he can divide the land in piece and make tenant contracts. It is broadly
called sharecropping or tenancy. Under this contract, th e tenant pays a certain portion 
of the harvest.2 Two prevalent forms of sharecropping contract is p ro rata rule and fixed 
rents. The landowner should decide which way he collect rent and what amount he will 
charge on sharecroppers.
Efficiency of Sharecropping
Sharecropping is a prevalent form of agricul tural producti on from the past to the 
present in various parts of the world. A basic question is why the sharecropping contract 
has been adopted so widel y in agriculture. There are basically two possible answers, 
which are efficiency- and inefficiency explanations.
Efficiency explanation suggests that tenant contract is adopted because it is better than 
other available alternatives. Here, efficiency has static- and dynamic dimension. Static 
efficiency implies that sharecropping is superior to or more productive than other available 
contractual forms. Dynamic efficiency concerns about investment for improving production 
in the future. Sharecropping is better for investment for p reservation or improvement of 
land quality than alternatives.
Inefficiency explanation implies the opposite, that is, sharecropping is inefficient than 
1) Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami (1992), p.1968.
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other forms of cultivation. The reason why this inefficient institution persists is because 
political or cultural factors hinder landowners from choosing non-sharecropping arrangements. 
Or non-ec onomic benefit might outweigh the benefit from choosing other forms of 
contracts.
Founders of modern economics favored inefficiency view. Adam Smith claimed that 
tenants don’t have incentives to improve the quality of leasing land.3 Al fred Marshall 
also suggested a similar view.4
However, various scholars challenged this view. For example, Cheung (1968, 1969) 
contested this traditional view and concluded that “inefficiency argument is illusory”. He 
suggested that the owner cultivation, wage worker or tenancy should bring about the
same output per worker.5 Since Cheung’s study, various th eoretical analyses have 
been done. They broadly focused on three aspects, which are2) risk sharing,3) moral hazard, 
4)3) long-term nature of contract.6
Although informative, these theoretical analyses usually highlight certain aspects of 
contractual arrangements and derive a general conclusion. However, they don’t usually 
provide rationale on why a specific aspect is more crucial than others. Then, collection of 
these theoretical analysis might not provide comprehensive answer for fully understanding 
the nature of sharecropping contract and its persistence. It means that empirical analysis is 
crucial. Empirical analysis can be various ways, but studying land reform is important for 
various reasons.5)
Land Reform
Land reform is a political measure that government redistributes property ri ghts of land. 
When property rights are redistributed under the name of land reform, it usually means 
redistribution of land from the current landowner to landless parties such as sharecroppers.
Various countries performed land reform and it is a continuing issue in many 
developing countries.6) Developing countries are mostly agricultural, and majority of people 
are farmers. However, land is owned by small number of landowners, and most people 
leased land for cultivation. This inequality is broadly criticized as the source of poverty in 
2) “Sharecropping is a form of land leasing contract in which the tenant shares the final product with the landlord as a 
partial or total payment of the rent.” Dubois (2008), p.455.
3) Smith (1776), Book 3, Chapter 2.
4) Marshall (1959), Book 5, Chapter 105 Cheung (1968), pp.1107-1108.
5) Dubois (2008). There are various papers that reviewed literature. Representative are Otsuka and Hayami (1992).
6) Yoo (2014) surveys land reform in East Asian countries.
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this country for two reasons (Figure 2-2).
Figure 2-2| Potential Impact of Land Redistribution on Economic Growth: An Illustration
First is static inefficiency. As sharecroppers cannot appropriate the whole output, they 
are l ess incentivized. This causes low productivi ty, and this low producti vity combined 
with heavy burden of rent ends up with poverty. Second is dynamic inefficiency. As 
farmers don’t own th eir land, they are not moti vated to improve quality of the land, and 
this lowers productivity.
Proponents of land reform claim that land redistribution resolves these inefficiencies. 
Land redistribution will relieve the farmers from heavy burden and improve their living 
standard. At the same ti me, this will moti vate farmers to work harder and to invest on 
improving performances. This will end up with increase of agricultural produc tion and ec 
onomic growth of the country. They claim that land redistribution improves economic 
growth as well as inequality.
Extensive empirical studies have been done on the effect of land redistribution, and 
two streams of literature are noteworthy. Fi rst are studies on sharecropping in post- 
bellum South of the United States. A series of studies Reid (1973, 1977), Alston and 
Higgs(1982), and Garrett and Xu (2003) analyzed efficiency of sharecropping in postbellum 
South. They all claimed that sharecropping is not inefficient.
Second is studies done by devel opment economists. Rec ently, Besley and Burgess 
(2000) and Banerjee and Iyer (2005) explored Indian sharecropping. Deninger, Jin, and 
Yadav (2013) explored plot-level data of West Bengal farmers.
Korean case can shed a new light on this literature. As introduced, Korea has a 
relativel y good data to studying the condition before the land reform, its process of 
implementation , and its impact. At the same time, this can contribute to uncovering the 
causes of Korean economic growth.
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Land Redistribution and Agricultural Productivity
Introduction
For last two to three decades, rising inequality has been discussed as one of the most 
important social problems all over the world. Many scholars have focused on economic 
consequence of high inequality and have warned that too much inequality can damage the 
ec onomic growth . However, due to data problem and oth er reasons, few studies have 
corroborated convincingly the causal relation between inequality and productivity growth.7)
Does reduction of inequality enhance economic growth? Then, how much? We answer 
to this question by analyzing a historical experience of Korea. We examined the impact of 
land redistribution (1945-1951) on the agricultural produc tivity. During the colonial period 
(1910-1945), landed farmers were only 20% in Korea. 50% of whole farmers didn’t own 
land at all and 30% cultivated both their own land and leased land. After the liberation in 
August 1945, land redistribution that was stimulated by land reform act occurred and by 
1951 the share of landed farmers had increased from 20%to 90%. Did this change improve 
agricultural productivity and ultimately promote economic growth? Answering this question 
can shed a new light on the aforementioned problem, the relation between inequality and 
economic growth.
Investiga ting this problem can contribute to economic development and related 
policies. Large number of developing countries are agricultural, and land reform has been 
considered a major economic and political agenda. Large number of former socialist 
economies also have a similar land ownership problem; How to redistribute collectivized 
land to  th e people  is  the  key issues  in  these  countries.  In  spite  of  such importance, 
empirical  studies  on  land reform is  relatively  rare.8) Detailed  analysis  on  the 
Korean experience help understanding the nature of the land reform and planning a  
successful implementation.
The  paper  goes  as  follows.  First,  we  overvi ew  the  history,  that  is,  to  review 
agriculture and sharecropping of Korea during colonial period and examine how the land 
reform proceeded after the liberation. Then, using prefecture (Gun, 郡 ) level data, we 
explore the correlation  betw een  the level of sharecropping and productivity during the 
colonial era. And we will measure the impact of land reform on productivi ty growth. 
7) Acemoglu and Robinson (2013), Cingano (2014), OECD (2014), Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides (2014), Piketty (2014), 
Stiglitz (2013).
8) Exception is Besley and Burgess (2000).
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After discussing some implications, we will conclude.
Land Ownership of Colonial Korea
Colonial Korea (1910-1945) was an agricultural economy. 70% of whole household 
were farmers, and 50-60% of total value added came out of agriculture.9) Sharecropping 
was the dominant form of agricultural production during the colonial era. Landed farmers 
were only 20%. 50% of whole agricultural household didn’t own land at all, and 20-30% 
were partial sharecroppers. 50-60% of the arable land was cultivated by tenants who didn’t 
own land at all (Figure 3-1).10)
Figure 3-1| Share of Arable Land Cultivated by Sharecroppers and Share of 
Sharecroppers out of Agricultural Households (%)
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Colonial Korea, years.
The rent in the contract of sharecropping varied across time and region, but the 
sharecropping contract was usually 50% of the output. This heavy burden was blamed the 
major source of poverty in rural area. If we consider the average size of cultivating land 
9) Statistical Yearbooks of Colonial Korea, Kim et al (2006). Industrialization also proceeded during this period. See Kim 
and Park(2007). Also English readers can refer to Kim and Park (2012) for a brief review of recent historiography on 
Korean economic history.
10) Kim (1993) and Lee (2013) claimed that the Cadastral Survey (1912-1918) executed by the colonial government 
increased landlords and spread tenancy. They propose that the governor-general tried to spread landlord system for 
accommodating Japanese migrants to the colony and for ruling Korean people more efficiently. However, this claim 
does not fit well with the evidence. As shown in Figure 3-1, the share of sharecropping was quite high even before 
the end of the cadastral survey. The share of sharecropping was stable throughout the whole period.
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combined with the 50% rent, the average income of tenants is inferred as one-third of 
landed farmers.11) This harsh condition was a cause of explosive increase in litigation on 
rent contracts and farmer protests in the 1930s.12)
Governor-General made some efforts to ameliorate this problem. For example, th ey 
performed some policies like “creation of landed farmers”. However, they were not 
successful, and the share of tenants out of whole farmers even increased throughout 
the 1930s. Fundamental changes like land reform cannot be discussed and impl 
emented under the colonial regime where Korean peopl e didn’t have any political 
rights. The liberation was, therefore, imperative not only for political freedom but also 
for improvement of economic welfare.
Land Redistribution after the Liberation
Korea was liberated in August 1945. The United States and the Soviet Union governed 
southern and northern parts of Korean Peninsula for a certain period of time. In case of 
the south, the Korean govern ment was established in August 1948. For both South and 
North, land reform was considered prima facie the most important poli tical agenda since 
the liberation. From now on, we will focus on the land reform in South Korea.13)
From 1945 to 1951, land redistribution occurred in South Korea, and it made a 
profound change in land ownership (Figure 3-2 and Table 3-1). The share of land owned 
by landed farmer was 35% in December 1945, but it surpassed 90% by the end of 1951.
Land redistribution was done in various ways, and they can be categorized into three. 
First was redistribution of vested land. The U.S. Military government and succeeding 
Korean government took over the land left by Japanese farmers and companies, and 
allocated them to Korean farmers. The total size of vested land redistributed during this 
period was 27 thousand hectares. About 73% of this redistribution was done by the U.S. 
military govern ment until 1948, and the remaining 27% was done by the Korean 
governmen t. Under the both regimes, the redistribution was basically sales of lands to 
farmers who cultivated those land as sharecroppers.
Second was land sales by the landlords. Expecting radical land reform, many landlords 
negotiated with tenants and sold their lands. The total amount of land redistributed in this 
way was 71 thousand hectares. As shown in Figure 3-2, the share of redistributed land in 
11) Kim and Hong (2016) provided a detailed discussion.
12) See footnote 4.
13) North Korean government (DPRK) executed land reform as well in the late 1940s. However, late 1950s, North Korean 
government performed collectivization of all arable lands. For the impact of collectivization on agricultural productivity, 
see Kim and Wee (2016).
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this way is the largest, and it was mostly done right before the establishment of the 
Korean govern ment. It is widely regarded that the landlord and the tenant traded land at 
market price.
Third is redistribution by the Land Reform Act. After a long debate, the parliament 
passed the law in June 1949, and the law was actually enforced from March 1950. 
According to the law, the govern ment took over the land from the landlord and 
compensate them for 150% of average annual production for five years. A farmer can get 
land up to 3 hectare, and the farmers should pay 150% of average annual production for 
five years to th e govern ment, which is equi valent to the compensation of the 
government to the landlords. The total amount of land redistributed in this way was 30 
thousand hectares.
Many scholars like Kang (1989) evaluated the land redistribution negatively. Main 
criticism is on the fact that the redistribution was basically purchase of tenants rather than 
free disposal. Furthermore, scholars including Kang (1989) compared land reform of South 
and North, and claimed that South Korean one was inferior.
However, recently more and more scholars give positive evaluations. Especially, studies 
that analyzes the ec onomic impact of land reform generally propose positive impacts. 
Jeon and Kim (2000), Park (2013), and Woo (2015) suggest that land reform 
contributed to human capital accumulation, rise of income, and economic growth 
ultimately.
Few studies examined impact of land reform on productivi ty grow th. Cho (2015) 
investigated this agenda, but the result was not clear. We go beyond the previous studies, 
and figure out the impact of land reform more rigorously.
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Figure 3-2| Changes of Landed Farmers, South Korea (Jungbo, %)
Source: Korea Rural Economic Institute (1989).
Table 3-1| Land Redistribution, 1945-1951
Categories Size of Land (thousand hectare)
Redistribution of Vested Land 271
Sales by Landlords 707
Redistribution by the Land Reform Act 300
Total 1,278
Source: Korea Rural Economic Institute (1989).
Strategy and Data
For measuring the impact of land reform, we examined change of ownership structure 
and output before and after the land reform. This is basically done by estimating 
production function. A typical production function that we can use for estimating impact of 
ownership structure and inputs on output is
14
If landed farmer is more productive than sharecroppers, α_1should have a positive 
value.
In our esti mation, we use prefecture level data. After investiga ting data condition, 
we chose 1940 and 1960 for the time before and after the land reform. Table 3 -2 
provides descriptive statistics of the variables used for our estimation.
Table 3-2| Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean s.e Min Max References
1940
Output (thousand) 141 121.3 75.0 0.5 413.5
Share of Landed Farmers 141 0.37 0.13 0.11 0.95
Land (thousand Jungbo) 141 83.5 48.9 0.4 241.0 year 1938
Farmer (thousand household) 84 14.2 10.9 0.7 99.2
1960
Output (thousand) 141 205.2 138.8 0.8 713.6
Share of Landed Farmers 141 0.87 0.07 0.48 0.97
Land (thousand Jungbo) 141 68.2 42.6 0.3 200.6 year 1960
Farmer (thousand
  household)
139 14.7 8.5 1.2 61.2 year 1963
Note: Farmer variable in 1940 is not available for Chunbuk, Chunnam, Kyongbuk Provinces
Tenancy and Productivity during the Colonial Period
For esti mating the impact of land reform, we first esti mated equation (1). It is an 
investigation of our presumption that sharecropping is less produc tive than landed farmer
s.14) The approach is similar with Woo (2000), but data is different. Whereas Woo used 
experiment results from agricultural research institute, we used prefecture data described 
above.
Figure 3-3 and Table 3-3 shows estimation results. First, the figure shows positi ve 
correlation between th e share of owned land and produc tivity. The coefficients of the 
share of landed farmers are statistically significant at the 5% and 1% each. The Equation 
(1) and (2) imply that at the mean level, 1%p. increase in the share of landed farmers 
would enhance productivity by 0.25 to 0.41%. Considering that this is just a simple 
change of ownership structure, this is not a small impact at all.
Of course, this estima tion result has endogen eity probl em. Farmers of the more 
14) Woo (2000) proposed that productivity of tenants was not lower than landed farmers. If it is true, the impact of land 
reform will be distributional and it won’t make a significant productivity growth.
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productive region could be more innovative, and they migh t run thei r lands with more 
productive way, for example, direct cultivation with agricultural labor. This inference 
implies that the above result might underestimate true value.
However, this is not a big concern at this stage for two reasons. First, the goal of 
this regression was to show that land reform matters for producti vity growth. Second, the 
land reform works as a kind of exogenous variable. As land redistribution reduced the 
share of landed farmers independent of productivity, this can work as a kind of 
instrumental variable. It means that if we estimate equation (2 ), this will allow us to 
measure α_1that is free from the endogeneity problem.
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Table 3-3| Agricultural Productivity and Land ownership in circa 1940 Dependent 
Variable = ln(output)
Eq(1) Eq(2)








Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Obs 141 84
R Square 0.9836 0.9838
Source: Number in parenthesis are standard errors.
Land Reform and Agricultural Productivity
Now, we estimate the impact of land redistribution on productivity. This is done by 
measuring correlation between change of ownership structure and change of output using 
prefecture l evel data. Fi gure 3-4 shows the correlation between changes in land 
ownership and agricultural productivity measured by output per land. This shows a strong 
positive correlation, which supports our inference.
We further examine th e correlati on by esti mating equation (2), and Table 3-4 
shows regression results. This also support the positive impact of land redistribution on 
productivity growth. The coefficient is 0.51. It means that 1%p. increase of landed farmer 
in a prefecture increased production by 0.5%.
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Figure 3-4| Changes in Owned Land and Agricultural Productivity, 1940-1960
Note: Agricultural productivity was measured as output per land.
Table 3-4| Changes of Land ownership and Agricultural Productivity  
Dependent Variable = Δ ln(output)
Eq(1) Eq(2)









R Square 0.9515 0.9442
Source: Number in parenthesis are standard errors.
Conclusion
Korean was agricultural society during the colonial period. Sharecropping was the 
dominant form of production in this period, and it was criticized as the major source of 
poverty. Since Korea was liberated in 1945, land redistribution proceeded in various ways. 
Using prefecture level data, we estimated the impact of land ownership in this period.
We provided two important results. First, using prefec ture level data, we examined 
whether sharecropping lowered agricultural productivity. The regression result suggests that 
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the productivity of sharecropp ers was lower than landed farmers. This strongly implies 
that land reform could improve agricultural productivity. Second, we investigated the impact 
of land reform on agricultural producti vity. The statistical analysis shows that land reform 
improved agricultural productivity. This result implies that land reform contributed to rapid 
economic growth after the liberation.
Land Reform and Human Capital Accumulation
Introduction
The Republic of Korea (h ereinafter referred to as Korea) has been one of the fastest 
growing countries to achieve economic success during the past half-century and its 
burgeoning economic growth was possible mainly due to the successful accumulation of 
human capital. According to the esti mation conducted in Jang (2007), the contribution of 
education on economic growth between 1975 and 2004 reached remarkable 40.7 percent. 
After independence, the Korean government emphatically promoted the public education 
expansion policy on top of the education fervor of Korean parents. As a result, the 
well-educated human capital has accumulated very rapidly, so that Korea was able to 
match the increasing labor demand required during the industrialization process.
Another reason why Korea was able to accumulate human capital at a rapid rate was 
due to its successful land reform, which reduced inequality in Korean society, allowing a 
large number of parents to afford the tuition needed for their children’s education. Also, 
low ered inequality meant that paren ts could expect their children to climb the social 
ladder of success through the means of education.
Indeed, with the land reform, myriads of former tenant farmers acquired tenant lands 
at a low price and have become independent farmers. As a result, they were not obliged 
to pay the rent for tenancy that reached as high as 50 percen t of total production. This 
obviously allowed the farmers to accumulate their wealth and even get a loan using their 
newly acquired land as collateral when needed. Such improved earnings and alleviated 
financial restrictions plausibly played an important role in enhancing the education level of 
the farmers’ children.
Numerous literatures on land reform also agree on the argument that it led to 
accumulation of human capital by redistribution of wealth (Kwon [1984], Seo [1987], Jang 
[2000], KREI [2003], Park [2013a], Park [2013b], Woo [2015]). Empirical studies on the 
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cases of the Philippines and India such as Hayami and Kikuchi (1999), Deininger et al. 
(2000), Deininger et al. (2009), and Deininger et al. (2011) also provide evidence on the 
role of land reform on human capital accumulation. In addition, empirical study on the 
relationship between inequality in land distribution and human capital accumulation 
confirms that th ere is indeed a close relationship between the two (Deininger and Squire 
[1998]; Galor et al. [2009]; Vollarth [2013]; Jun and Kim [2014]). Therefore, it would be 
rational to say that th e Korean land reform contributed to the accumulation of human 
capital.
However, aside from Woo (2015), th ere is no literature that empirically studi es the 
Korean case. The most literatures on the relationship between the Korean land reform and 
the accumulation of human capital are based on the mere fact that the reform and the 
burgeoning of public education occurred around the same time. In case of Woo (2015), 
there is a limitation as it analyzes the relationship between primary school enrollment rate 
and the land reform. Because the elementary school enrollment rate has already reached 
almost 100 percent by 1960, due to a widespread of compulsory education policy in the 
1950s, it is difficult to assess the impact of the land reform on human capital 
accumulation using the primary school enrollment rate data. Also, the sample is limited to 
40 gun (county) in Gyeongsang Province.
This paper attemp ts to examine the impact of th e land reform on human capital 
accumulation in Korea by empirically analyzing the reform data of all gun in Korea 
and enrollment rate of secondary school. It especially takes an extended look at wh 
ether the level of impact differs between the genders, because the preference for male 
offspring was still prominent at that time. Therefore, if the land reform indeed 
resulted in increase in household incomes, it could have comparatively benefited 
females more who w ere previously neglected in education.
The paper is organized as follows. Secti on II presents the historical background with 
the emphasis on the land reform process and the expansion of secondary education. Section 
III examines the main framework of the empirical analysis. Section IV presents the result 
of empirical analysis and its implications. Lastly, Section V concludes the paper.
Land Reform
In late 1945 after independence, tenant land accounted for approximately 144.7 million 
chungbo (one chungbo is equivalent to 2.45 acres) of total 222.6 chungbo in Korea (65 
percent). In the case of paddy field, the proportion was 71 percent. Also, among 206 
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million agrarian households, nearly half of them were pure tenant farmers who did not 
own any land and 35 percent of them were landowners, who, however, needed to borrow 
more land to farm in order to eke out a living. Landed farmers, including landlords 
accounted for only 14 percent. With such circumstances, there was a wide spread of social 
consensus that the landlord system should be abolished through a land reform and 
distribute land to farmers.
The problem was how to determine the distribution method, the ceiling on the 
ownership of land, the price of land, as well as the compensation and the reimbursement 
method. There had been numerous len gthy discussions after indep endence  and in  the 
meanti me, distri bution of the govern ment-vested lands was executed. The government- 
vested lands were previously Japanese land owned by New Korea Company (郡 郡郡郡 )) 
and the distri bution was executed by the US Military Govern ment  in Korea.  The  size 
of the disposed land reached approximately 199,000 chungbo.15) The  farmers  could  
receive up  to  2  chungbo  and were asked  to  reimburse 300  percent  of average  
annual production in 15 years, which was not too far off from the price of land at that 
time.
Meanwhile the landlords voluntarily sold their land before the reform, as they were 
concerned that they might have to dispose their land at an unfavorable rate under the 
reform. The scale of such voluntary disposal was approximately 713,000 chungbo (Table 
1). And th e price was around the same or a little higher than the price at the time of 
the land reform. As vast size of land was on the market, th e price was estimated to be 
lower than the usual price (300 percent of average annual production). However, the 
farmer purchasing land was relatively more burdened with reimbursement pressure, as he 
was obliged to pay the lump-sum price within three months (at the latest within two 
years) (Jang et al. [2009]). On the other hand, the farmer was able to make rei 
mbursement on the installment plan within five years at the time of the land reform.
The Land Reform Act was enacted in June 1949, after long discussions. And its 
implementation began in earnest after the revised law had been promulgated in March 
1950. The main points of the Land Reform Act were as follow. First, only paddy fi elds 
were the target and others such as mountains and forests and orchards were excluded.
The upper limit for ownership was 3 chungbo per a household, and the compensation 
for land purchase was the reimbursement of 150 percent of average annual production in 
five years on the equal installment plan. The households that received distributed land also 
15) The total size of previously Japanese-owned land is estimated to be 273,000 chungbo, including those sold by the 
Korean government. (Table 1)
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had to reimburs e the same amount in five years equally. And the same reimbursement 
condition also applied to the land distri buted by the US Military Government. Until the 
reimbursement was made, distributed land was not permitted any transaction, donation, 
mortgage or security rights.
Yet, the size of distributed land to the farmers through the reform was only about 
302,000 chungbo, which is less than half of the size of voluntarily sold land. Even if the 
land disposed by the US Military Government is included in count, the total distributed 
land was 575,000 chungbo by the late 1951, which accounted for only 39.7 percent of the 
total tenant land of 144.7 million chungbo in late 1945. This is the main reason why the 
evaluation on the land reform so far has been generally negative. Recentl y, there has 
been a new point of view that not only the disposal of Japanese-owned land, but also the
voluntary disposal by the landlords was a part of the land reform (KREI [1989]16); 
Lee [2015]). However, it seems not every scholar agrees with such a view.17)
As Table 1 shows, 89.1 percent of tenant  lands (128.8 million chungbo) out of total
144.7 million chungbo, including land previously owned by Japanese, converted to 
independent land through th e means of the US Military Government distri bution, the 
Korean governmen t distri bution, and voluntary disposal by landlords. As a result, only 
8.1 percent of total arable lands (158,000 chungbo) remained as tenant lands by late 195
1.18)  (4.3% or 74,000 chungbo if land not subject to distribution are excluded.)
The proportion of independent land and farmers burgeoned as a result of the land 
reform. However, the problem of small-scale farm management was worsened. Table 2 
shows the change in size of farm management before and after the land reform. Compared 
to year 1945, the number of households owning less than 0.5 chungbo actually increased 
by 250,000 in year 1951, thus the proportion also rose by nine percent point. And almost 
80 percent of the total farming households managed a small-sized land of less than one 
16) KREI (1989: 1031), the most renowned study on the land reform, also seems to be on the same side of the 
view that voluntary disposal of land by landlords could be considered as a part of the land reform. Because it 
states that “no matter which means were used to reform, the land eventually became independent. The land 
reform in Korea was deployed in two ways, one by Government distribution and another by voluntary disposal 
of landlords.
17) For instance, Park (2013; 2014) denotes the sales of Japanese-owned land as the first land reform and the 
enactment of the Land Reform Act as the second land reform. But he does not mention the voluntary disposal 
of land by landlords at all.
18) As this paper, other literatures generally offer this value as the proportion of tenant lands after the land reform. It is 
derived from estimation conducted in KREI (1989: 1030) that is considered as one of the most conspicuous study on 
the land reform. However, the estimation process seems excessively bold and simple, because the value of 8.127 
percent in 1951 is simply derived by conducting a linear regression with the values of 14.1 percent in 1962 and 17.9 
percent in 1969.
    Also, non-tenant land and 91.9 percent of arable land are assumed to be converted to independent land. And all 
independent land excluding those distributed by the government is assumed to be those voluntarily disposed by the 
landlords. In sum, the proportion of tenant lands after the land reform is derived from an extremely bold assumption, 
therefore, is prone to serious error, as is the size of land voluntarily disposed by the landlords. These values need to 
be scrutinized in the future.
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chungbo. It implies that the land reform was not able to solve the problem of small-scale 
farm management at all, though th e problem could not have been easily solved due to 
rapidly growing population after independence. N everth eless, such problem limited 
the impact of the land reform.
Table 4-1 Change in size of farm management before and after the land reform
Area
(chungbo)
Year 1945 Year 1947 Year 1951
Number of 
Household s Proportio n
Number of 
Household s Proportio n
Number of 
Household s Proportio n
Less than 
0.5 676,805 33.7 894,775 41.2 932,615 42.7
0.5~1.0 671,186 33.4 724,167 33.3 781,910 35.9
1.0~2.0 459,443 22.9 409,204 18.8 372,970 17.1
2.0~3.0 154,571 7.7 113,194 5.2 93,401 4.3
More
than 3.0
47,072 2.3 31,095 1.4 3,034 0.1
Total 2,009,077 100.0 2,172,435 100.0 2,183,930 100.0
Source: KREI (1989).
School Education
When Korea was under Japanese rul e, the Japanese Colonial Government of Korea 
concentrated on providing only primary education . As a result, by the year 1945 when 
Korea gained independence, primary school enrollment rate of South Korean region was up 
to 64 perc ent. And the Korean government also devoted itsel f to spread primary 
education through the country. Gratuitous compulsory primary education is clearly stated in 
the Constitution and the Education Law and the government intended to implement it from 
June 1950. However, the Korean War broke out, delaying the implementation until 1954, 
in which a six-year compulsory education completion plan was promoted. The goal of 
six-year compulsory education completion plans was to raise the enrollment rate of 
school-aged children to 96 percent by 1959, the target year. It also aimed to build 
classrooms and raise secure education funds needed to build them. In fact, the proportion 
of funds for compulsory education in education budget reached approximately 70~80 
percent. With such efforts, the Korean government was able to complete the goal of 
six-year compulsory education compl etion plan and by 1959; the enrollment rate of 
school-aged children was 96.4 percent, when it was only 69.8 percent in 1951. The result 
was astonishing considering that the average primary school enrollment rate was only 48 
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percent among the developing countries in 1960 (Kim et al. 1997). Korea was able to 
provide primary education both rapidly and successfully.
On the oth er hand, the spread of secondary education progressed relatively at a
slow rate. The basic cause for this phenomenon can be found in the education policy 
of Japanese Colonial  Government. Even  in  the times  of colonial  state, credentialism  
was already such prominent a factor that one’s academic background was already one of 
the main determinants for finding a job. For that reason students wished to furth er their 
education, the Japanese Colonial Govern ment did not seem as keen on spreading 
secondary education. By the 1930s, the competition for secondary education became so 
high that only one out of five was able to advance. Some students even moved to Japan 
in order to enter secondary school. And in one extreme case, it was reported that a young 
student committed suicide after failing to enter a secondary school.
Although th e enrollment rate of primary education in Korea far exceeded that of 
developing countries as mentioned earli er, the enrollment rate of secondary school was 
more or less stagnant even after independence until the 1950s. In fact, the enrollment rate 
of secondary school was below that of average developing countries in 1960 (Kim et al. 
1997). In the 1950s, the government concentrated its attention and investment on 
establishing compulsory primary education system, which eventually led to a relatively 
stagnated spread of secondary education.
As the 1950s was the period of compulsory primary school education establishment, 
the 1960s and 1970s can be described as the expansion of secondary education. The main 
reason was that th e number of students advancing to secondary educati on dramatically 
increased, after the compulsory primary education has settl ed down. However, the 
government simply could not supply enough education facilities to meet the ever- 
increasing demand for secondary education. A social problem arose from this gap that 
there was overh eated competition for en tering the secondary school. To solve this 
problem, the Ministry of Education adopted a new admission policy that required no 
entrance examination in July 1968. Starting with schools in Seoul in 1969, the new policy 
was adopted by other metropolises such as Busan and Daegu in 1970, and finally national 
wide in 1971. As Figure 1 shows, the increase in enrollment rate of secondary school is 
conspicuous from 1970 and by the mid 1980s, it reached near 100 percent.
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Figure 4-1 Change in Primary and Secondary School Enrollment Rate (1960~90)
Source: Statistics Korea (2005).
Note: The primary school enrollment rate is attained by dividing the number of students by population aged from 
6 to 11 and the secondary school enrollment rate is attained by dividing the number of students by 
population aged 12 to 14.
Methodology and Data
In this paper, we hypothesize whether the land reform indeed contri buted to the 
accumulation of human capital; the increase in enrollment rate of secondary school would 
be larger in the area that was more influenced by the reform. The following model
(1) is used to examine this hypothesis.
In the equation above, i represents the region (gun). The dependent variable ∆enrolli 
represents the change in secondary school enrollment rate from 1940 to 1960 (differenced 
variable). The main reason for utilizing the data in 1940 and 1960, in order to analyze the 
impact of the land reform, is as follows.
Year 1960 was the point when the farmers, who have begun to own their own land 
because of the reform, were at the end of due date for paddy reimbursement. Therefore, it 
was the time that could be interpreted as end of the land reform. Also, the data on 
education and agriculture at a gun level have become available around 1960. On the other 
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hand, year 1940 was set to represent the peri od of pre-reform, as gun level data were 
unavailable due to various reasons such as turmoil after independence and war in the 
1940s.
The explanatory variable ∆ownedlandi, the most important one in this study, is the 
change in share of independent land from 1940 to 1960. The variables representing change 
in level of provision of education and demand for education between 1940 and 1960 are 
included as control variables in this model. Also, the other included control variables 
consist of dummy variable ci tydummyi, the regions that had used to be a gun in 1940 
but divided into a shi (city) and a gun in 1960, and provincedummyi, representing 
province.
The level of provision of education is expressed by school density (schooldensityi) and 
it is computed as (number of schools ×4×4×3.14) / area of gun(km2). And in order to 
represent the demand for education, school-aged population density is calculated using 
population aged 12~14 / area of gun(km2). Other variables such as area per house 
(areaperhousei) and share of paddy in farm (sharepaddyi) are also included, because they 
are important determinants of income level of farmers along with proportion of independent 
land.
Each data are based in gun level, and the criterion for gun dictated by administrative 
districts in 1940. In this case, there is a problem of how to treat those gun in which 
status were different between 1940 and 1960. The most changes in status were in a form 
that a gun was divided into a shi and a gun. In this study, even if a region was divided 
into distinct shi and gun in 1960, if it had been one gun in 1940, it is considered to be a 
single gun in this study. For example, even though Sacheon gun in Gyeongnam Province 
was divided into Sacheon shi and Samcheonpo gun in 1956, they will be assumed as 
Sacheon gun in this study, as it was a single gun in 1940.
The city (that used to be called bu( 郡 ) in 1940) such as Seoul, Busan, Incheon, 
Daegu, Daejeon, Gwangju, Mokpo, Masan and Gunsan are excluded in this study as 
agriculture was not prominent in those areas so that they were determined to be influenced 
less by the land reform. In the case of Ongjin gun, though it became a part of Gyeonggi 
Province after independence, it had been under the jurisdiction of Hwanghae Province in 
1940 and as the data on Hwanghae Province are not available, it is excluded from this 
study. Thus, data on total of 137 gun are gathered and analyzed.
Finally, the secondary school enrollment rate of all gun in 1940 is assumed to be zero 
for two reasons in this study. The main reason is that there is no reliable data on 
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secondary school enrollment rate at a gun level in 1940. It is possible to identify the 
location of schools and number of students from “Chosunjehakgyoillam” (『조선제학교일
람』), but unfortunatel y not every gun had secondary school at that ti me.
There w ere only ten  teachers’ colleges at that ti me and all of them were located in 
major shi. Because the cases of students transferring to secondary school in other gun or 
shi had occurred frequently, it would be a dangerous interpretation to assume th e students 
in schools stated in “Chosunjehakgyoillam” (『조선제학교일람』) were in fact th e students 
who attended the same school, thus distorting the enrollment rate of secondary school in 
gun.
Another reason is due to extremely low secondary school enroll ment rate at that time. 
There is a possibility that assuming the secondary school enrollment rate in all gun in 
1940 to be zero has less variation than using the data from “ Chosunjehakgyoillam”. As 
stated above, the Japanese Colonial Government limited access to secondary education to 
the Koreans, so that the number of students in secondary school, including training schools 
with condensed curriculum, was less than 70,000 when the number of students in 
elementary school reached almost 1.4 million. Considering the fact that the population aged 
between 12 and 14 was 1.57 million, the secondary school enrollment rate was only four 
percent. In addition, since the enrollment rate probably would have been higher in shi, that 
of gun would have been much lower than four percent. Difference among gun would have 
been also minute.
Since the secondary enrollment rate of all gun in 1940 is assumed to be zero, the 
factor on provision of education in 1940 would not be considered. The modified model is 
as follows.
The data used in this model can be divided into two parts, one education-related and 
another agriculture-related. Firstl y, in order to calculate th e secondary school enrollment 
rate in 1960, data on number of students in secondary school and school-aged population 
are needed. However, since there is no available data on both categories, data on   
number of students in secondary school stated in “Statistics on Educational
Administration 1958” (『문교행정통계일람』) and data on age composition of population 
conducted in  “1955 Population  Census  of Republic of Korea”  can be used. In  this 
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case, there is a discrepancy in time when two data were produced. Therefore, population 
aged 9~11 in 1955 “Population Census of Republic of Korea” is assumed to be congruen t 
to population aged 12~14 in 1958 in this study.
To estimate school density and school-aged population density, data on number of 
schools, students and area per gun are necessary. Number of schools and students can be 
found in aforementioned “Statistics on Educational Administration 1958” and area of gun 
can be found in “Korea Statistical Yearbook 1960”.
On the agriculture-related side, data on change in share of independent farmers, area of 
farms p er house, share of paddy fields in 1940 and 1960 are required. For the data of 
year 1960, the results from “Agricultural Census Statistics of Shi Gun Eup & Myeon 
1960” can be used.
Table 4-2 Comparison between the Year of Available Statistics for Each Province and 











Gangwon 1939 49.5 49.8 0.3 56.4 57.1 0.7
Gyeonggi 1940 71.5 71.5 0.0 74.0 74.0 0.0
Gyeongnam 1935 63.7 63.2 -0.5 67.4 66.6 -0.8
Gyeongbuk 1938 55.7 56.0 0.3 58.0 58.2 0.2
Jeonnam 1937 53.4 52.9 -0.5 67.4 67.3 -0.1
Jeonbuk 1934 77.1 77.1 0.0 79.9 79.5 -0.4
Chungnam 1938 71.9 72.4 0.5 75.2 75.7 0.5
Chungbuk 1939 66.4 66.6 0.2 67.7 67.2 -0.5
Source: Refer to the main te xt and reference page on details of used data. Data on tenancy rate in 1940 is from 
Statistics Korea (kosis.kr).
However, not every gun published such data in 1940, so the data published by each 
province should be utilized. Unfortunately, the provinces do not publish agriculture- related 
statistics every year and only few remain available among published statistics. Thus, it is 
basically impossible to gather data for every gun in 1940.
Due to such limitation, available data from “Doseilban” (『郡郡 郡郡 』) or “Statistics 
on Agriculture” ( 『 농업통계 』 ), that were published closest to 1940 in each province, 
are utilized. For example, in the case of data of Gyeonggi Province, th e data  of  year  
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1940 stated in “Statistics on Farmin g” ( 『 농사통계 』 ) published by Gyeonggi Province 
in 1940 is used as reference. On the other hand, in the case of data of Jeonbuk Province, 
the data of year 1934 stated in “Statistics on Agriculture” published by Jeonbuk Province 
in 1935 are utilized.
Although the reference year differs among provinces, this would not influence the 
result greatly, as there seems to be no huge change in agricultural sector between mid 
1930s and 1940. For example, Table 3 shows the change in share of tenant lands in 
provincial level.
Even though the reference year of Jeonbuk Province is at the earliest with 1934, the 
share of tenant lands does not differ much between 1934 and 1940 data. Other provinces 
also show very minute change in share of tenant lands between the reference year and 
1940, with ±0.8 percent point. This phenomenon is due to rapid spread of the landlord 
system before 1930. In the 1930s, the share of tenant land generally remains stagnant in 
every province except Gangwon Province (Figure 4 -2). Although the difference would be 
larger in gun level than in provincial level, such difference would not have a great impact 
on the result.
Figure 4-2 Share of Tenant Land in Each Province, 1931~1940
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Governor-General
Estimation Results
In this section, empirical analysis on the relationship between the land reform and the 
accumulation of human capital is conducted and implication of the results is discussed. 
Before conducting the analysis, data summary of variables used is shown in Table 4.
Firstly, average share of independent land in gun level increased greatly from 34.7 
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percent in 1940 to 87.0 percent in 1960. On the flip side, this implies that 13 percent of 
land still remained tenant land even after th e land reform. However, considering the fact 
that there were some land that were difficult to convert due to certain characteristics as 
stated before, the share of independent land converted back to tenant land would not differ 
much at least until the end of the land reform.
Table 4-3 Basic Statistics
variable obs mean sd min max
1940
ownedland 137 0.347 0.125 0.087 0.820
areaperhouse 137 10.749 2.760 5.098 20.694
sharepaddy 137 0.555 0.176 0.010 0.857
1960
enroll (all) 137 0.203 0.075 0.039 0.377
enroll (male) 137 0.302 0.109 0.064 0.547
enroll (female) 137 0.093 0.050 0.000 0.237
ownedland 137 0.870 0.070 0.434 0.972
schooldensity 137 0.437 0.251 0.063 1.364
schoolageddensity 137 13.902 7.311 1.062 42.199
areaperhouse 137 8.223 1.609 4.567 12.090
sharepaddy 137 0.609 0.161 0.026 0.876
Note: Unit for area of land per house is danbo.
The average area of land per house was decreased from 10.75 danbo in 1940 to 8.22 
danbo in 1960. The main reason was due to increased population after indep endence, 
when the land area did not increase much. Also, urban area was not yet industrialized in 
the 1950s and population was concentrated in rural area. The decrease also implies that the 
farmers were not able to overcome the problem of small-scale farm management at all as 
aforementioned.
The average secondary school enrollment in gun level in 1960 was over 20 percent. 
But there was a huge gender difference that male enrollment rate was 30.2 percent and 
female enroll ment rate was only 9.3 percent. For reference, according to data from 
Statistics Korea (2005) shown in Figure 1, the secondary school enrollment rate in 1960 
was over 30 percent that there is a huge discrepancy to the same figure in Table 4. There 
are two possible explanations. Fi rstly, the enrollment rates of major metropolitan area 
such as Seoul and Busan are not included in Table 4. S econdly, the reference year of the 
figures in Table 4 is 1958. Since compulsory primary education policy began to be 
genuinely implemented from 1954, this could have led to increase in secondary school 
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enrollment rate in the late 1950s.
Table 4-4 shows the results of the empirical analysis to evaluate the impact of the 
land reform on the secondary school enrollment. According to the results, school density 
and school-aged population density that represent demand and supply of education are both 
statistically significant at one percent level, with coefficient of school density showing 
positive and that of school-aged population density showing negative sign. Thus, the 
enrollment rate increases as number of schools increases and decreases as population 
density increases. The possible reason for increased school-aged populati on density leading 
to lower enrollment rate would be either there were not enough schools or there were 
myriads of households that were unable to send every child and sel ected only few to 
attend school due to poverty. The latter reason would probably have larger effect at that 
time. Two income-related control variables are included in Equation (2), but the variables 
representing change in area of land per house and share of paddy fields both turn out to 
be not statistically significant.






∆ownedlandi 0.075 (0.037)** 0.082 (0.040)**
∆schooldensityi 0.247 (0.029)*** 0.245 (0.029)***







citydummyi 0.074 (0.013)*** 0.067 (0.013)***
provincei yes yes
constant 0.169 (0.023)*** 0.162 (0.027)***
obs 137 137
Adj. R2 0.626 0.621
For the most important ownedlandi variable, the coefficient shows positive sign and is 
statistically significant at 5 percent level in both models. The more the share of 
independent famers increased by the land reform, the more the increase in secondary 
school enrollment rate in 1960. This result implies that the land reform did contri bute to 
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the accumulation of human capital.
The effect of the land reform on secondary school enrollment rate is divided by 
gender difference this time. As mention ed before, secondary school enrollment rate of 
male and female might be influenced differen tly by the land reform. At that ti me, 
thepreference for male offspring was very prominent that if the reform indeed led to 
increased income of farmers, female might have gained access to education relatively 
more than male did as female was generally excluded from education.
The results of this empirical analysis shown in Table 4-5 do not differ much from 
those of Table 5. However, the result on ∆ownedlandi is interesting. Although  the  
coeffici ents of ∆ownedlandi variable of both male and female are positive, only the 
coefficient of female is statistically significant at five percent level and that of male is not. 
This implies that the increase in share of independent famers after the land reform led to 
the increase in secondary school enrollment rate of female. Thus, the land reform 
contributed to the accumulation of ‘ female’ human capital, rather than male human 
capital.











0.062 (0.027)** 0.060 (0.028)**
∆schooldensityi 0.356 (0.043)*** 0.352 (0.044)*** 0.129 (0.020)*** 0.129 (0.021)***











citydummyi 0.089 (0.019)*** 0.087 (0.020)*** 0.058 (0.009)*** 0.058 (0.009)***
provincei yes yes yes yes
constant 0.276 (0.035)*** 0.261 (0.041)*** 0.052 (0.017)*** 0.054 (0.020)***
obs 137 137 137 137
Adj. R2 0.595 0.591 0.566 0.559
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Conclusion
In this study, the empirical analysis on the relationship between the land reform and 
the secondary school enrollment rate is conducted to examine whether the land reform has 
contributed to the accumulation of human capital in Korea by utilizing the gun level data. 
The possibility of effect being different on gender is also evaluated.
The results imply that the region with higher increase in share of independent famers 
during th e land reform show higher increase in secondary school enrollment rate.
This proves th e hyp othesis that land reform influenced positively on the 
accumulation of human capital. Also, the secondary school enrollment rate of female 
increased as the share of indep endent farmers rose, when the increase in enrollment rate 
of male proved to be statistically insignificant. This result is interpreted as when the 
income level of farmers went upwards by th e land reform, female, who was neglected in 
education due to male offspring preference, relati vely gained more opportunity for 
education than male did.
The significance of this study is it empirically proves the hypothesis that the land 
reform has contributed to the accumulation of human capital using gun level data. 
Previously, such hypothesis was argued only with circumstantial evidences in other 
literatures. Also, it is significant that the results suggest the contribution of th e land 
reform on the accumulation of human capital is more conspicuous in female than in male. 
However, reliable data on secondary school enroll ment rate before the land reform  could 
not be gathered, so that the enrollment rates of all gun in 1940 are assumed to be zero. 
This, of course, is prone to statistical error in analyzing the results. Also, due to lack of 
data, the analysis was conducted without reflectin g various oth er variables that might 
have significant effect on enrollment rate. Such limitation cannot be overcome unless a
new set of data is discovered though.
The land reform in Korea was indeed ex tremely imp ortant in economic development 
after indep endence. Although the effect has not been analyzed enough empirically due to 
lack of data, there have been various rec ent efforts to approach this issue empirically. 
With such continuous efforts, if new data were to be discovered, the economic implication 
of the land reform would become more apparent.
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